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PANEL DISCUSSION: THE IMPACT OF U.S.
TRADE LAW ACTIONS ON
BUSINESS DECISIONS IN KOREA
Panelists.,
David Laverty, Marks, Murase & White, New York;
Young J. Kim, Managing Director of Corporate Planningand
Coordination, Goldstar Co. Ltd.;
SK Lee, US. Regional Director, PohangIron and Steel Co. Ltd.

D. LAVERTY
As a graduate of this school, it is a special honor for me to be here
with two individuals who have played a very important role in some of
the most important trade actions that have affected Korea.
Young J. Kim is from Goldstar, Co., Ltd., a member company of
the Lucky-Goldstar Group, one of Korea's major chaebols, or conglomerates. S.K. Lee is with POSCO, the Pohang Iron and Steel
Company, which is Korea's premier steel manufacturing company.
Before these gentlemen deliver their prepared remarks, I will provide
some background on their industries and their companies, as well as a
bit of history to set the framework for both of their presentations.
This introductory discussion of some of the more important trade actions that have affected consumer electronics in the case of Goldstar,
and steel in the case of POSCO, will remind us that we are here to
assess the impact of U.S. trade laws on business decision-making, or,
as Stanley Lubman characterized it last night, to engage in a form of
legal sociology by looking at the impact of law on behavior.
As in the case of Taiwan, there has been a significant history of
U.S. trade actions affecting Korean industry. The goal has been to
restrain imports coming into the United States, whether through antidumping or countervailing duty proceedings, or through the use of
other tools. In our look at the impact of such trade actions, we will be
devoting some attention to their effect on export and investment strategy. Trade actions can have an important impact on investment strategy. Both of these companies have diversified and have moved
production overseas, including to sites such as the United States, and
our panelists will be able to discuss this development.
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First, I would like to provide some background on Mr. Kim. The
Lucky-Goldstar Group is one of the outstanding companies in Korea.
It is one of the main four chaebols; the other three of these diversified
conglomerates are presently Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo. Samsung has been ranked twentieth in the Fortune International 500 and
Daewoo is thirty-fifth. If Lucky-Goldstar were to be ranked on a consolidated basis, it would be in the same league with those two conglomerates. Goldstar Co., Ltd. has been a leader in consumer
electronics since its beginnings in the late 1950s. The company was
producing radio sets before anyone else in Korea. It began exporting
to foreign markets well before most Korean companies, and certainly
was a leader in electronics.
As for the historical nutshell that I promised, I would like to take a
look at the years 1976 through 1979. The year 1976 saw the first major escape clause actions against the Japanese; the U.S. International
Trade Commission recommended very substantial tariff increases on
color televisions. President Carter chose to take the path of export
restraints and an agreement. Certain themes that were present at that
time, I think, were later played out on the Korean side. The Japanese
began to invest in the United States. They began to take sub-assemblies from overseas, bringing them here and putting them together.
Through this process, they were able to avoid the imposition of quotas. They also began to shift toward higher and higher levels of technology, away from color televisions to VCRs and other more
sophisticated products. From Mr. Kim's presentation, we will recognize some of these same developments on the Korean side.
Mr. Kim has been with Goldstar since 1969. He was here in the
United States during some key years, from 1983 to 1987. The year
1983 was a time of major antidumping activity against Korean companies. Mr. Kim was then president of Goldstar Electronics International, the United States marketing subsidiary of the company, so he,
more than anybody, I think, witnessed directly the impact of U.S.
trade actions on the company.
Y.J. KIM

It is a great pleasure to address such a notable group of officials,
scholars, businessmen, and attorneys specializing in trade law. I
would like to thank the University of Michigan, and especially Mr.
Clyde Stoltenberg for the honor. This is my first visit to Ann Arbor,
although I have frequently flown to Detroit in the past for business
meetings with major retailers in the metropolitan area.
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The points of my address are derived mainly from the electronics
industry's perspective, in particular from Goldstar's.
1.

CHRONOLOGY OF ANTIDUMPING PROCEEDINGS

Since labor unions and Zenith Electronics Corporation filed dumping complaints against Korean and Taiwanese companies for color television sets in 1983, there have been a series of annual investigations
and rulings (See Exhibit 1'). The investigations were later broadened
to include color picture tubes and PCBs, which are main components
of color television sets.
2.

IMPACT ON KOREAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY

The impact of U.S. trade laws, especially antidumping rulings, on
the Korean electronics industry can be considered in the following
respects.
First, restrictive U.S. trade laws have shifted exports away from
the U.S. to non-U.S. markets. The share of exports to the U.S. has
decreased from fifty-nine percent in 1983, to thirty-eight percent in
1988 (See Exhibit 2). Korean manufacturers understood the danger of
heavy dependence on the U.S. market in the face of mounting protectionism. They have, therefore, actively sought to diversify the market.
However, we cannot overlook other major factors influencing market diversification. Korean manufacturers could accelerate the penetration of European, Asian, and Latin American markets faster than
the U.S. market, where competition was much more intense. In conjunction with this, consumer electronic products which were mainly
developed for the U.S. market until the mid-eighties were developed
for European and Asian markets, which required different specifications (e.g. PAL, SECAM). The establishment of economic ties with
communist countries also spurred exports to those countries in recent
years, thus reducing the share of exports to the U.S.
Let's consider a special case of the U.S. trade law, namely the antidumping proceeding. The impact of antidumping rulings on color
television exports to the the U.S. from Korea has been substantial. In
1983, color television exports to the U.S. stood at $303 million, which
accounted for seventeen percent of all electronic products. In 1988,
they stood at $218 million - a decrease in absolute terms of less than
four percent of all electronic products. The decrease in color television exports to the U.S. was accompanied by an increase in production
in the United States. In 1981, Goldstar began the construction of a
1. Exhibits 1-4 appear following the full text of the panel discussion.
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manufacturing plant in the United States, and Samsung soon followed.
One of the casualties of the late antidumping rulings is Daewoo Electronics, which stopped selling color television sets in the U.S. in 1988
due to the levying of a twenty-three percent duty. Daewoo does not
have a manufacturing operation in the U.S.
Growing protectionism, together with the globalization of the electronics industry and rising manufacturing costs in Korea, have resulted in the proliferation of Korean-owned production facilities in
foreign countries. Major consumer electronic companies, such as
Goldstar, Samsung and Daewoo, have established fully- or jointlyowned factories in several countries. The major force behind this
trend is the globalization of the industry, in terms of competition as
well as cooperation. Companies are competing in multiple markets
with products produced in several countries.
There are many challenges facing overseas manufacturing operations. The most serious problem is the lack of local parts suppliers.
Other problems include a shortage of skilled workers, local regulations, and cultural differences. It takes time and management skill to
operate manufacturing plants in foreign countries. However, it is becoming evident that a local presence - in both sales and manufacturing - is critical to success in foreign markets.
Another consequence of the U.S. trade law proceedings is the establishment of government guidelines on the export price of consumer
electronic goods to the United States. Each year, the government revises guidelines for export prices. Items that do not meet the guidelines are not granted an export license by the Electronics Industry
Association of Korea. However, it is questionable whether such measures actually influenced dealer costs in the United States. Since the
nature of consumer electronics is very competitive, subsidiaries in the
U.S. have to compete based on prices dictated by the market. Korean
subsidiaries, mostly competing in the promotional segment as followers, felt the greatest pressure to conform to the dealer price dictated by
the market forces, when compared with market leaders.

3.

WHO BENEFITS FROM THE U.S. TRADE LAW?

Given the impact of U.S. trade law proceedings on the Korean

industry, who actually benefits from them? In the short run, the answer is the industry which the law aims to protect. However, in the
long run, benefits are very hard to pin down and controversial at best.
As can be seen in consumer electronics, Zenith is the only remaining
American-owned producer of color television sets, despite repeated attempts to protect the industry from foreign competition. It does not,
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however, mean that there is a dearth of consumer electronics manufacturing in the United States. Foreign companies have actively built
new plants or rationalized existing plants. The net impact on employment may not be as serious as described by the media.
If we assume the purpose of trade laws is to protect domestic ownership of the manufacturing base of an industry, then the results in
consumer electronics are disappointing. Furthermore, consumers
have periodically suffered by paying higher costs on products due to
shortages artificially created by such measures as antidumping proceedings. The DOC and companies involved in the dumping issues
incurred substantial legal and administrative expenses which could
have been used for more productive purposes.
4.

OVERCOMING THE TRADE FRICTIONS

I would like to propose the following in order to overcome the
friction in bilateral trade issues.
(1) The U.S. government should reverse its protectionist policies
in the international trade area. By escalating protectionism, the actions of the U.S. government are leading the world into a potential
trade war. We should all respect the spirit of free trade and promote it
continuously.
(2) Mounting pressure on Korea to open markets to foreign goods,
especially U.S. agricultural products, should be eased. Unilateral
pressure for import liberalization will fuel anti-American feelings in
Korea, and may well reduce the options for the Korean government.
As a result of the recent GATT meeting, Korea has agreed to eliminate all important restrictions by July, 1997, which clearly demonstrates our commitment to free trade. But the elimination process will
take time, since it involves structural changes of affected industries.
(3) The antidumping actions against color television sets should be
repealed; instead, both parties should enter into a voluntary restraint
agreement (VRA), which should encompass color television sets, picture tubes, and PCBs. At the same time, the U.S. government should
enact legislation to encourage investment in manufacturing plants in
the U.S. by foreign companies.
D. LAVERTY
Mr. S.K. Lee will be speaking about the steel industry, which has
played a major role in Korea's recent industrialization. POSCO is the
largest manufacturing company in Korea, based on sales revenue. Unlike Goldstar and the other major chaebols, or conglomerates, POSCO
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does have a government ownership role. POSCO is now one of the
largest steel producers in the world and gaining quickly. Also, like
Goldstar, POSCO has invested overseas. One of its major investments
is with USX in California, in the form of a joint venture that began in
April, 1986.
For a brief overview of the U.S. trade actions against Korea affecting steel, I will start with the U.S. overproduction of steel in 1978. A
number of factors seriously affected the American steel producers'
ability to compete in the global marketplace: high labor costs, ecological concerns, and foreign competition. In 1978, the U.S. implemented
the Trigger Price Mechanism, which basically provided that once
prices dropped below a certain set amount, an expedited antidumping
investigation would be triggered.
From 1978 to 1984, a number of antidumping and countervailing
duty investigations were conducted. In 1984, the United States entered into a voluntary restraint agreement involving twenty-nine countries. Mr. Lee will be discussing the VRAs, or voluntary restraint
agreements, in quite some detail.
The U.S. International Trade Commission, in a major escape
clause proceeding, recommended that quotas be imposed on steel. The
President at the time rejected such action, but did negotiate the VRA.
Korea was, at that time, allotted 1.9 percent of the U.S. total domestic
demand for steel. This VRA remained in effect until July, 1989, and
has been extended for another two and one-half years.
Since joining POSCO in 1973, Mr. S.K. Lee has been involved extensively in exports. Most recently, he was executive director in
charge of exports and imports of steel. He has worked in Singapore,
Los Angeles, Houston, and Washington, D.C. Currently, Mr. Lee is
based in Washington, D.C., where he serves as the U.S. regional director for POSCO.
S.K.

LEE

As the U.S. representative for POSCO, I have been asked to speak
concerning the impact of U.S. Antitrade Actions on the Korean steel
industry. This speech is particularly timely since the Bush Administration has just concluded its renegotiation of the Voluntary Restraint
Agreements, or VRAs, which will restrict foreign steel exports for at
least the next 21/2 years.
The VRA program is only the latest in a series of U..S. government
programs over the last twenty years designed to protect the U.S. steel
industry from foreign competition. U.S. protection first began in 1968
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with the voluntary restraints imposed on steel imports from the EC
and Japan, which lasted until 1974.
In order to understand the historical significance of the protection
of the Korean steel industry, consider this: POSCO was not founded
until 1968, the construction of POSCO did not commence until 1970,
and steel was not produced until 1973. By this time, the U.S. market
was already well on its way to being a protected market.
The second wave of protection began in 1978 with the development of the Trigger Price Mechanism. It was at that time that the
Korean steel industry began formulating its strategy toward the U.S.
market. The U.S. steel industry had made "unfair trade" the focus of
their campaign for renewed protection. An antidumping action was
filed by a small U.S. manufacturer of carbon steel plate - Gilmore
Steel - against plate from Japan.
This was the first case in which the Treasury Department used the
sales below cost provision of the antidumping law enacted as part of
the 1974 Trade Act. The Treasury Department found dumping margins in the range of twenty-five percent, largely because home market
prices in Japan were disregarded when they did not fully recover all
costs - including interest, fixed and variable overhead, and expenses
- in their home market sales. This case is historically important because it signalled to the U.S. steel industry what a powerful weapon
the antidumping law could be.
In 1977, the U.S. steel industry found itself in the midst of a recession and demanded protection. The Carter Administration responded,
claiming that the Treasury Department had failed to administer the
unfair trade laws and that it would do so if the U.S. steelmakers would
only file cases.
The industry took the Administration up on its invitation and filed
massive antidumping and countervailing duty actions against all suppliers in the EC. At the same time, the industry began its program of
claiming that it could not be expected to compete and raise capital in
the face of "unfair" foreign imports. These cases threatened to impose
a virtual embargo against steel imports from the EC - much as the
Gilmore case had halted imports of carbon steel plate from Japan.
Rather than permit the cases to proceed to a politically unacceptable conclusion, the Administration struck a deal with the U.S. steelmakers - in return for the withdrawal of all actions against the EC,
the Administration would implement a set of floor prices - trigger
prices - which would apply to imports of all steel products from all
sources.
The theoretical basis of the Trigger Price Mechanism, or TPM,
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was that the prices themselves would be constructed based on the costs
of the Japanese steel industry - which was acknowledged at that time
to be the lowest cost producer of steel in the world. Imports which
entered below these prices were not prohibited, as such, but they could
serve as the basis for the self-initiation of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations by the U.S. authorities.
Initially, the TPM worked rather well since it coincided with the
emergence of growth in the market. However, in 1980, when trigger
prices started to stabilize, the industry demanded higher trigger prices.
When the Administration failed to deliver these higher prices, the industry refiled their antidumping and countervailing duty cases against
the EC. Since the underlying conditions which had brought about the
necessity of the TPM remained unchanged, the TPM was reinstated
after roughly six months with new adjustments that would result in
even higher trigger prices.
These more politically sensitive trigger prices sowed the seeds of
their own destruction. During the new TPM, the Korean industry's
trade strategy toward the U.S. market emerged.
The new TPM lasted about 11/2 years, from the end of 1980
through the beginning of 1982. The system finally collapsed because
the trigger prices themselves, having no root in the market place or in
actual Japanese costs for that matter, got to the point where they were
higher than U.S. domestic prices.
The Korean strategy was to demonstrate that the Korean steel industry had supplanted the Japanese as the low cost producer in the
world. Korean pipe and tube producers, therefore, filed for permission
to export at prices below the trigger prices. In order to do this, they
had to prove that they were not subsidized and that the prices and
costs in the Korean market were lower than the trigger prices. Previously, only Canadian producers had tried this.
The initiative taken by Korean producers at that time had two important effects for the Korean industry. First, even though the preclearance system itself was terminated, cases were not initiated against
Korean pipe producers who sold below TPM based upon those applications. Second, and more important for the long run, the de facto
success of those applications sent a strong signal to the U.S. Government and steel industry that Korean steel could compete in the U.S.
market without the same vulnerabilities to unfair trade actions as EC
suppliers.
The collapse of the TPM was brought about by the filing of massive antidumping and countervailing duty cases against all major steel
suppliers - including the EC, Japan, and Korea. Many EC suppliers
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remained vulnerable to these unfair trade cases so the EC agreed to
restrain its steel exports in exchange for the withdrawal of those cases.
This VRA, which was entered into on November 1, 1982, became the
basis of the VRA's of today.
In the countervailing duty cases initiated against the Korean steel
industry, the U.S. steel industry alleged that the Korean industry was
subsidized in the range of thirty to forty percent. The Commerce Department determined that, in fact, any actual subsidization was commercially insignificant with findings ranging from zero to 1.88 percent,
depending on the product. Most importantly, the Commerce Department agreed that the government investment in POSCO itself did not
constitute a subsidy because it was consistent with commercial considerations and principles.
The U.S. industry continued to bring a variety of antidumping and
countervailing duty cases. The most serious was filed by U.S. Steel in
1983 which, in essence, called for the reinvestigation of the 1982 countervailing duty determination and again alleged subsidies in the range
of fifty percent.
In the end, the results were not markedly different as the Department determined that the subsidy levels were between zero and 3.6
percent. The differences were due, in our judgment, to political decisions concerning some programs which were meant to demonstrate
that the Department had taken into account the views of the domestic
industry. Even with this marginal increase in the subsidy level, it reconfirmed Korea's basic position that it was a fair trader. Around the
same time, in mid-1984, Bethlehem Steel filed a petition under section
201 of the Trade Act of 1974 for quotas on steel imports. The U.S.
government refused section 201 relief, but this case ultimately became
the vehicle by which the U.S. government imposed the VRA system in
1984.
Korea's strategy during the period that the countervailing duty
and 201 cases were pending was to establish itself as a "fair trader" in
the public mind. To this end, the Korean steel industry commissioned
a pamphlet which was widely disseminated.
This strategy was successful. Even Senator Heinz of Pennsylvania,
the Congressional leader of the forces seeking protection for the steel
industry, acknowledged that Korea was a "fair trader" along with Japan and Canada. Similar sentiments were echoed by Ambassador
Brock in testimony before Congress.
As a result, when the President announced the VRA program on
September 18, 1984, Korea had greater negotiating leverage due to its
willingness and ability to defend unfair trade cases. Korea needed a
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credible basis upon which to base an argument that Korea was unique.
The "fair trader" position provided that basis.
The U.S. was willing to provide Korea a quota no greater than 1.7
percent of the market. Korea's final position, prior to settlement, was
that it should receive a 2.1 percent market share. On December 17,
the day before the deadline established by the President for the conclusion of VRA agreements with the major suppliers, the U.S. and Korea
compromised at 1.9% plus an additional 160,000 tons for some special
steel products.
The Korean strategy since 1982 has been to affirmatively identify
and address the concerns raised by the U.S. industry and U.S. Government regarding Korea's steel trade with the United States. Our own
natural efficiencies have served us well in this regard but we have also
specifically prepared ourselves for the artificial world of U.S. unfair
trade laws. With the assistance of our lawyers, we are constantly assessing our position under these laws so that we can adopt a consistent, long-term export policy with minimal disruption.
It should be pointed out, however, that while POSCO has successfully defended itself in the unfair trade cases, it has spent a lot of time,
effort, and money to prove itself innocent. An exporter with less commitment to the U.S. market might have preferred to leave the market
rather than make the significant commitment these cases require even
if the exporter ultimately could prove that it was not engaging in unfair trade practices. For this reason, I suspect that the U.S. industry
frequently uses these cases to drive out small volume exporters and
new participants in the U.S. market. This strategy works well with
importers-who would rather switch suppliers than face the uncertainty
of the cases.
POSCO's commitment of time and money in these cases was so
great that it is said, only half jokingly, that POSCO's new Kangwong
facility was only slightly more expensive. In my view, much of this
time and expense is unnecessary if the goal is to identify unfair prices
or subsidized sales. The Commerce Department's methodology bears
little relationship to actual business practices. Furthermore, the Commerce Department often requests information in a manner that requires a complete restatement of the company's books. Consequently,
a company's workload is increased dramatically and the results mostly
reflect the artificial nature of the rules. For example, no company in
the world sets its prices based on a sale-by-sale analysis of its freight
costs. Nevertheless, the Commerce Department frequently requires a
company to identify inland freight costs on a sale-by-sale basis.
As I mentioned earlier, the VRAs negotiated in 1984-1985 in large
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part reflected each country's ability to defend the unfair trade cases so
Korea did quite well. However, the VRAs also reflected, like all good
cartels, the historical market shares of the major suppliers. In the case
of steel, these suppliers were Japan and the EC. The VRAs froze for
five years the 1981-1983 market shares of these suppliers. Japan and
the EC not only benefited from their historical shares but also from
the fact that they had a diverse product mix. The VRAs specifically
restricted countries from varying their product mix from the products
they were selling to the U.S. prior to the VRAs. The U.S. virtually has
a unilateral right to impose a quota limit at a minimal level on any
new product shipped.
Therefore, the VRAs locked in the products and the levels of shipment each country was allowed. Thereafter, market forces had very
little to do with steel import patterns. New producers are also prevented from entering the U.S. market since each country internally
distributes the quota among traditional suppliers.
In conclusion, my company looks at the unfair trade cases as a cost
of doing business in the United States. Fortunately, our successful approach to unfair trade cases has assured us of an important presence in
the U.S. market and we have not had to search out other markets,
diversify our products, or invest in the U.S. in order to recover from
the effects of such cases. We have, however, sought to diversify our
markets and products because that is the policy that any dynamic
company should naturally follow. For example, POSCO's U.S. investment in a joint-venture project with USX (UPI in Pittsburgh and California) is a testament to POSCO's success in the U.S. market and is
based solely on our assessment of the economic viability of that
project.
The VRAs that were recently renegotiated are basically a rollover
of the prior VRAs for another two and one-half years. Therefore, negative aspects of the VRAs will continue to impact the Korean steel
industry for the next two and one-half years. I hope we will see a real
end to U.S. protection of steel in March, 1992.
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Exhibit 1
Chronology of Antidumping on U.S. Bound Color Television Sets
May

2, 1983

Labor union and Zenith Electronics Corporation file dumping complaints
against Korean and Taiwanese manufacturers of color television sets

Mar.

1, 1984

Department of Commerce (DOC) releases final results of 735 Review
Goldstar
14.77%
Samsung
15.95%
KEC (later Daewoo)
16.57%

Dec. 28, 1984

DOC releases final results of the 1st Annual Review
Goldstar
7.47%
Samsung
12.23%
Daewoo
14.88%

Jan.

9, 1986

Suspension of customs liquidation on color picture tubes and PCB from
Korea

Nov.

14, 1986

DOC releases final results of the 2nd Annual Review
Goldstar
. 1.37%
Samsung
2.06%
Daewoo
3.49%

July

1, 1988

DOC releases final results of the 3rd Annual Review
Goldstar
2.34%
Samsung
3.21%
Daewoo
23.30%

Exhibit 2
Electronic Goods Exports
(Unit: US$ million)
'83

'84

'85

'86

'87

'88

'89
(JAN-JUN)

Exports of
Electronic
Goods (A)

3,047

4,204

4,318

7,363

10,836

15,715

7,843

1,802

2,491

2,271

3.959
_1

4,647

6,005

3,052

B/A (%)

59.1

59.3

52.6

53.8

42.9

38.2

38.9

Color TV
Exports

303

88

Exports
to USA
(B)

to USA

296

234

395

264

218

(-2.3)

(-21.0)

(68.8)

(33.2)

.(-17.4)

11.9

10.3

10.0

5.7

3.6

(C)
C/B (%)

16.8

2.9
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Exhibit 3
ESTIMATED HOUSEHOLD
PENETRATION BY PRODUCT
(AS OF JUNE 1989)
FIGURE 13

i

-I-I-I-m-

ALL TELEVISION
COLOR TV

96%

COLOR TV WITH MTS

17%

LCD TV

3%

p[

MONOCHROME TV

58%

PROJECTION TV

5%

Um

VCRs
- CAMCORDERS

98%

I]

HOME SATELLITE EARTH STATIONS

64%

-

8%

-

3%

AUDIO SYSTEMS

91%

- COMPACT

57%

COMPONENT

49%

-

m---

HOME RADIOS

98%

HOME COMPACT DISC PLAYERS

16%

CORDLESS TELEPHONES

23%

TELEPHONE ANSWERING DEVICES

28%

HOME COMPUTERS

22%

HOME SECURITY SYSTEMS

12%

PRERECORDED VIDEOCASETTES

49%
0

25%

50%

Note: Percentages are based on a current estimate
of 90.7 million U.S. households.

75%

100
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Exhibit 4
Overseas Manufacturing Operations
of Korean Electronics Companies
United States

Goldstar

Color TV, Microwave Oven
Video Tape

West Germany

Samsung
Goldstar

Color TV
Color TV, VCR

Spain

Samsung (JV)

Color TV, VCR

Portugal
France

Samsung (JV)
Daewoo (JV)

Color TV
Microwave Oven

U.K.

Goldstar

Microwave Oven

Daewoo

VCR

Samsung

Color TV, VCR,
Microwave Oven

Mexico

Goldstar

Color TV

Turkey

Samsung
Goldstar (JV)
Samsung

Thailand

Goldstar (JV)

Color TV
Microwave Oven
Color TV
Color TV, B/W TV,
Audio, Washer

Indonesia
Philippines

Samsung (JV)
Daewoo
Goldstar (JV)

Color TV, VCR
Electronics
Washer
Color TV

Hong Kong

Samsung (C)
Daewoo (JV)

Malalysia

Goldstar (C)

Color TV

China

Samsung
Samsung (JV)

Argentina

Daewoo (JV)
Daewoo (JV)

Color TV
Refrigerator, Color TV
Refrigerator
Audio

NOTE: JV ...

Joint Venture, C ...

Electronics

Consignment

